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A WALK THROUGH THE CIRCUITS: THE DUTY TO
DISCLOSE SOFT INFORMATION
JANET

E.

KERR*

INTRODUCTION

One of the more interesting' yet ambiguous areas in federal securities regulation is soft information 2 disclosure. In recent years
* Associate Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Pepperdine University School of
Law. J.D., Pepperdine University School of Law, 1978; LL.M., New York University,
1979. The author served as a staff attorney in the Division of Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1978-81, and is a member of both the California
and New York Bars.
1. See, e.g., Fiflis, Soft Information, The SEC's Former Exogenous Zone, 26 UCLA L. REV.
95 (1978); Mann, Prospectuses: Unreadable or Just Unread? A Proposalto Re-examine Policies
Against Permitting Projections, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 222 (1971); Schneider, Soft Information Disclosure: 4 Semi-Revolution, 1984 INST. ON SEC. REG. 19; Schneider, Disclosure of "Soft
Information," 1979 INST. ON SEC. REG. 169; Schneider, Disclosure of "Soft Information" in
SEC Filings, 28 Bus. LAw. 506 (1973); Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information in SEC
Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 254 (1972) [hereinafter Nits & Grits]; Schneider & Shargel,
Mandatory Disclosure of Appraisals and Other Soft Information: A Comment on Flynn v. Bass
Brothers, 1985 INST. ON SEC. REG. 237; Note, Mandatory Disclosure of Corporate Projections
and the Goals of Securities Regulation, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1525 (1981); Note, Mandatory Disclosures of Soft Information in the Market for Corporate Control, 35 EMORY L.J. 213 (1986);
Note, Target CorporationDisclosure of Soft Information in Tender Offer Contests, 54 FORDHAM L.
REV. 825 (1986); Note, Disclosure of Soft Information in Tender Offers After Flynn v. Bass Brothers Enterprises, Inc., 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915 (1985).
2. "Soft information" is defined as "opinions, predictions, analyses and other subjective evaluations," as distinguished from "hard information," which is defined as
"statements concerning objectively verifiable historical facts." Carl W. Schneider described soft information as follows:
Although a comprehensive definition of soft information is not readily apparent, several non-exclusive and non-exhaustive categories can be identified:
(1)forward-looking statements concerning the future, such as projections, forecasts, predictions, and statements concerning plans and expectations; (2) statements concerning past or present situations when the maker of the statement
lacks the data necessary to prove its accuracy-for example, information on a
company's historical share of the market, when it does not have access to precise statistics concerning its competitors; (3) information based primarily on
subjective evaluations-for example, representations concerning the competence or integrity of management, the relative efficiency of a manufacturing
operation, or the appraised value of assets; (4) statements of motive, purpose,
or intention, since it is frequently easier to verify objectively what was done
than to determine why it was done-for example, explanation of the reasons
for which an auditor has been discharged; (5) statements involving qualifying
words, such as "excellent," "ingenious," "efficient" and "imaginative," for
which there are no generally accepted objective standards of measurement in
most contexts.
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the SEC policy on the subject can only be described as one in rapid
transition. The SEC has gone from a traditional policy of generally
prohibiting the disclosure of soft information, to allowing and encouraging it in some situations, to even requiring its disclosure
under certain circumstances. 3
The circuits' reactions run the gamut in response to the SEC's
shifting position. Some circuits cling to tradition,4 while others,
even though recognizing the change in SEC policy, refuse to reflect
this change in their decisions.' Finally, two circuits appear to embrace current SEC policy on the subject and have developed their
6
own approaches to reflect it.
This article provides a guide to those attempting to navigate the
legal mine field of soft information disclosure. In order to fully discuss this area, the article is divided into three parts: past and present SEC policy, a review of the circuits, and problems with the
various circuit approaches.
I.

PAST AND PRESENT

SEC

POLICY

All of those circuits addressing the issue of soft information disclosure devoted at least some discussion to SEC policy in the area.7
As mentioned previously, the traditional SEC position generally
Nits & Grits, supra note 1, at 255.
Schneider further noted the difficulty involved in attempting to classify certain information: " 'Hard' and 'soft' must be recognized as highly relative concepts suggesting
no sharp dividing line. Many apparently hard statements have soft cores and vice
versa." Id. at 256.
In a recent address to the Practicing Law Institute's 18th Annual Institute on Securities Regulations (November 6-8, 1986), Schneider included negotiations as a type of
soft information. Address by Carl W. Schneider, 1986 INST. ON SEC. REG. 1639 [hereinafter Address by Schneider].
3. See infra Part I.
4. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 292 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981); Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214, 1221 (9th Cir. 1980).
5. See Walker v. Action Indus., 802 F.2d 703, 709 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 952 (1987); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1292 n.10 (2d Cir.
1973).
6. See Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 241-42 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986); Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., 744 F.2d 978, 988 (3d Cir.
1984).
7. See, e.g., Walker v. Action Indus., 802 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 952 (1987); Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986); Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., 744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984); South
Coast Servs. Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1982);
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981);
Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1980); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
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prohibited the use of soft information in disclosure documents.8
This position surfaced in the SEC's comment letter practice9 as well
as in its rulemaking. In 1956 the SEC added a note to rule 14a-910
that listed "predictions as to specific future market values, earnings
[and] dividends" as "examples of what, depending upon particular
facts and circumstances," may be misleading in proxy statements.''
Additionally, the SEC stated that issuers with securities in registration should not make any projections, predictions, or estimates with
respect to income, earnings, or the value of securities.' 2
The reason for the SEC's position was clear. The Commission's internal application of a balancing test resulted in the view
that the risks flowing from the disclosure of possibly over-optimistic
management predictions and other projections of company performance outweighed any benefits derived by investors. The SEC's
perception of the unreliability of soft information, its potential to
mislead investors, and the lack of sufficient Commission resources
to evaluate its accuracy quickly negated any benefits flowing from
3
the disclosure of such information.'
The traditional SEC position came under fire, however, in the
early 1970s.14 Empirical studies disclosed the importance and materiality of certain soft information to an investor making an informed
decision with regard to a corporation's future earning power.' 5 As a
result of these studies, an evolution began in the SEC's policy toward soft information disclosure.
8. See Nits & Grits, supra note 1, at 258.
9. Id. at 259 n.12.
10. Rule 14a-9 proscribes material misrepresentations or omissions in connection
with proxy solicitations. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1987).
11. Id. Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 5276,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
76,380 (Jan. 17, 1956).
12. Guidelines for the Release of Information by Issuers, Securities Act Release No.
5180, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
78,192, at 80,578-79
(Aug. 16, 1971).
13. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400, 408- 09 (N.D.
Ill. 1964) (discussing the Commission's traditional approach); see also Flynn v. Bass Bros.
Enters., 744 F.2d 978, 985-87 (3d Cir. 1984); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d
1281, 1294 (2d Cir. 1973); see generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATIONS 163 (1983); Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5992, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
81,756 (Nov. 7, 1978).
14. See A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFILS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD
§ 6.5(431)(3), at 136.123 (1985); T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 78
(1985) (citing commentators). See also Mann, supra note 1, at 223.
15. See Securities Act Release No. 5992, supra note 13, at 81,036-37. See also Earnings
Projections and Rule 14a-9 Amendment, Securities Act Release No. 5699, [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,461, at 86,201 (Apr. 23, 1976).
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In 1975 the Commission shocked the legal community by publishing a series of rule proposals that would allow the disclosure of
6
projections of future economic performance in certain situations.,
The Commission, shortly thereafter, in 1976, announced formally
that its long-standing policy of prohibiting disclosure of soft information may have contravened investors' interest in securing predictive information. Admitting its error, the SEC stated it would not
object to the disclosure of projections of future economic or corporate performance in public filings, as long as the disclosure of such
information was made in good faith, had a reasonable basis, and was
accompanied by information sufficient to permit informed investment decisions. 1 7 To further underline its changing policy, the SEC
amended rule 14a-9, deleting future earnings from the list of examples of potentially misleading disclosures.' 8
Two years later, the Commission made an even more startling
move. In 1978 the Commission, based on the "significance attached
to projection information and the prevalence of projections in the
corporate and investment community," announced that it would encourage voluntary disclosure of management projections.' 9 To further enhance the SEC's policy of permissive disclosure of futureoriented information, the Commission adopted rule 175,2 o which
provides a "safe harbor" for certain types of issuers2 ' who wish to
disclose "forward-looking" statements. 2 2
Following closely on the heels of rule 175, the Commission announced that in certain circumstances soft information disclosure
16. See, e.g., Proposed Rules on Earnings Projections, Securities Act Release No.
5581, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,167 (Apr. 28, 1975).
17. Securities Act Release No. 5699, supra note 15, at 86,200-01.
18. Id.

19. Securities Act Release No. 5992, supra note 13, at 81,037.
20. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175, 240.3b-6 (1986).
21. Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6084, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,117 (June 25, 1979). The purpose of the rule
is to encourage voluntary disclosures of projections and other soft information both in
Commission filings and elsewhere. The rule protects issuers and management from liability for misleading investors if projections and other soft information are made in good
faith and have a reasonable basis. Note, The SEC Safe Harborfor Forecasts-A Step in the
Right Direction?, 1980 DUKE L.J. 607, 609.

22. The term "forward-looking statement" is defined as:
(1) A statement containing a projection of revenues, income (loss), earnings (loss) per share, capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure or other
financial items;
(2) A statement of management's plans and objectives for future operations;
(3) A statement of future economic performance contained in management's discussion and analysis of financial condition results of operations in-
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was not only permissive but required. In 1979 the Commission
promulgated regulation 240.13e-3, requiring that in going-private
mergers, asset appraisals which are received by the issuers and are
material to the transaction be disclosed to stockholders. 23 In 1980
the Commission issued a release voicing the staff's insistence upon
the disclosure of good-faith, reasonably based appraisals in proxy
contests in which the principal issue is the liquidation of all or a
portion of the issuer's assets.2 4 Finally, in 1982 the Commission
amended regulation S-K to permit disclosure of estimates of lessthan-proven oil and gas reserves in certain situations.2 5
In addition to the preceding rules and regulations that specifically address the issue of soft information disclosure, this type of
disclosure may be required under the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws.2 6 In interpreting how these general catchall
provisions relate to soft information disclosure, certain circuits have
fashioned various approaches.
II.

REVIEW OF THE CIRCUITS

The present section of this article discusses the various approaches taken by the circuits in addressing disclosure duties involving soft information. Only those circuits having some established
position in the area are mentioned.2 7
cluded pursuant to Item 303 of Regulation S-K (§ 229.303 of this chapter) or
Item 9 of Form 20-F; or
(4) Disclosed statements of the assumptions underlying or relating to any
of the statements described in paragraphs (c)(l), (2), or (3) of this section.
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175(c), 240.3b-6(c) (1986).
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1986).
24. Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 16,833, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
24,117 (May 23, 1980) (requiring that such appraisals also have a reasonable basis).
25. 17 C.F.R. § 229.102, instruction 5 (1986). See also 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-10(k)(5) to
-10(k)(6) (1986). Disclosure is permitted only when these types of estimates were provided previously to a person that was engaged in an acquisition of the company or its

equity securities. Prior to this amendment, regulation S-K prohibited the disclosure of
estimates of oil or gas reserves, unless proved, in any document publicly filed with the
Commission. 17 C.F.R. § 229.20, instruction 4 to item 2(b) (1986).
26. For example, section 14(e) of the Williams Act and rules lOb-5 and 14a-9 of the
Exchange Act may apply. Section 14(e) of the Williams Act proscribes material misrepresentations or nondisclosures in connection with tender offers. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)
(1982). Rule lOb-5 prohibits the making of "any untrue statement of material fact" or
omission of any "material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.., in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986). For rule 14a-9, see
infra note 39.

27. Courts in the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have, on occasion, addressed the issue of soft information disclosure. For the reason stated above, however,
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The Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth circuits
are examined. Each circuit is discussed separately, with the exception of the Second and Seventh, which are strikingly similar in their
approach.
A.

The Second and Seventh Circuits-HoldingFast to Tradition

The Second and Seventh Circuits are in general agreement on
the disclosure obligations for soft information. Both circuits have
held that there is no duty to disclose soft information.
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.28 stands as authority for the Second
Circuit's position that there is no duty to disclose2 9 asset appraisals"0 or financial projections." The factual situation in Gerstle arose
they are not included in the body of this article. These circuits warrant a passing mention nonetheless.
The First Circuit, in Pavlidis v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 737 F.2d
1227, 1236 (1st Cir. 1984), held that speculative and misleading asset appraisals need
not be disclosed in a proxy statement. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits each have a noteworthy case concerning the duty to disclose purposes, plans, and proposals. See generally
Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240 (8th Cir.), aff'g 474 F. Supp.
1541 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (holding that disclosure of control purpose is required regardless
of its indefiniteness; however, the disclosure of nondefinite "plans or proposals" can be
misleading); Susquehana Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1970)
(holding that there is no duty to disclose preliminary merger negotiations). For a good
discussion of these cases, see Note, Mandatory Disclosures of Soft Information, 35 EMORY L.J.
213, 231-38 (1986). These circuits, however, do not have an established position on the
general issue of soft information disclosure. Finally, some courts have cited the Tenth
Circuit case of Sunray DX & Oil Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 398 F.2d 447 (10th Cir.
1968), for the position that asset appraisals involving oil reserves are too speculative
and, therefore, need not be disclosed. The Tenth Circuit, however, has not recently
addressed soft information disclosure; thus, it is unclear what impact, if any, this case
has on the circuit.
28. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
29. Id. at 1294. For other Second Circuit cases dealing with soft information disclosure, see Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 711 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding no
duty to disclose merger negotiations in press release); Rodman v. Grant Found., 608
F.2d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding no duty to disclose speculative financial predictions
in proxy statement); Billard v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 526 F. Supp. 218, 221 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (holding no duty by tender offeror to disclose predictions of impact of tender
offer announcement on market); but see Hecco Ventures v. Avalon Energy Corp., 606 F.
Supp. 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding no duty to disclose speculative liquidation values in
a proxy statement in connection with a merger, but recognizing that in certain rare situations disclosure of soft information may be required). The district court in Hecco briefly
considered the criteria for mandatory disclosure of soft information, which were outlined in Flynn v, Bass Bros. Enters., 744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984), but the court found the
information too speculative to require disclosure. Hecco, 606 F. Supp. at 520. For the
Flynn criteria, see infra text accompanying note 96. The Hecco case seems to stand by
itself and is not reflective of the current position of the circuit.
30. Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1294. The case specifically addressed the disclosure of this
type of soft information.
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when Gamble-Skogmo embarked on a plan to gain control of General Outdoor Advertising (GOA). 32 Between April 1961 and March
1962, Gamble-Skogmo acquired 50.12% of GOA's common stock,
thereby achieving control over the company.
Shortly thereafter, GOA's dismal 1961 earning's reports came
out, disclosing that income from advertising plants had fallen off
substantially and that the expected rate of return would continue to
decline. The reports reflected the serious financial problems that
the outdoor advertising industry as a whole experienced during that
time. 34 In reacting to these reports, Gamble-Skogmo decided to sell
some of GOA's plants,3 5 culminating in the sale of twenty-three of
GOA's thirty-six plants.3 6 Gamble-Skogmo then proposed a merger
with GOA, which the boards of GOA and Gamble-Skogmo approved.3 7 GOA's stockholders then received a proxy statement
seeking their vote on the merger.3 8
31. Although the Second Circuit has not specifically addressed the disclosure of financial projections, two district court opinions cited Gerstle as authority for the nondisclosure of this type of soft information. See Straus v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 460 F. Supp.
729, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding no duty to disclose financial projections in registration statement); Mendell v. Greenberg, 612 F. Supp. 1543, 1550 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding no duty to disclose financial projections in a proxy statement). See also Walker v.
Action Indus., 802 F.2d 703, 708 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 952 (1987) (predicting that the Second Circuit's position would be in agreement with the Mendell case if
the issue were specifically addressed). Although not mentioning the Gerstle case specifically, the following cases follow the spirit of Gerstle in finding no duty to disclose financial
projections. See Fisher v. Plessey Co., Ltd., 559 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding no
duty to disclose financial projections in tender offer documents); Caspary v. Louisiana
Land & Exploration Co., 579 F. Supp. 1105, 1109 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding no duty to
disclose financial projections in proxy material), aff'd, 725 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1984). In
reaching its decision, the Caspary court quoted Billard v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 526 F.
Supp. 218, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 683 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1982):
Although the SEC now permits disclosure of [certain] projections . . . no
company is required by the SEC to issue projections .... Nor has any court ever

imposed liability for failure to include projections in a registration statement,
Strauss v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Nor does there appear to be any case in which a
court has imposed liability for failure to disclose projections in other contexts.
"Ordinarily . . . the courts discourage presentations of future earnings, appraisal asset valuations and other hypothetical data in proxy materials." Kohn
v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 874 (1972).
32. Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1284.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1284-85.
36. Id. at 1285.
37. Id. at 1286.
38. Id. at 1287.
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The plaintiffs, minority stockholders of GOA, alleged that the
proxy statement violated rule 14a-9. 39 They claimed that it was materially false and misleading because it failed to disclose the appraisals of GOA's remaining unsold plants at the time of the merger and
Gamble-Skogmo's intent to realize large profits from the sale of the
remaining plants shortly after the merger.40 The plaintiffs claimed
that both the appraisals and Gamble-Skogmo's intent to sell were
material to GOA stockholders in deciding whether to retain their
shares of GOA or to exchange them in the merger for GambleSkogmo convertible preferred stock. 4
The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on both disclosure issues.4 2 With respect to its finding that the nondisclosure of
the asset appraisals was actionable, the court primarily relied on the
amicus brief filed by the SEC. The brief stated that "although appraisals generally cannot be disclosed because they may be misleading, existing appraisals of current liquidating value must be
39. Rule 14a-9 was promulgated pursuant to section 14(a) of the Exchange Act of
1934. Section 14(a) makes it unlawful for any person to solicit any proxy "in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors ...." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982). Specifically, rule 14a-9 prohibits solicitation by
means of a proxy statement
containing any statement which, at the time and in light of the circumstances
under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact,
or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in
any earlier communication ... which has become false or misleading.
Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1291.
40. Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1295.
41. GAO's earning potential was dismal if it continued with outdoor advertising;
however, extraordinary profits would be earned from its potential liquidation. The
Gamble-Skogmo convertible preferred stock, on the other hand, was "a security involving much less risk but with a correspondingly reduced interest in the profits potentially
available through sales of advertising plants." Id. at 1302. The court stated:
Certainly the intent of those in control of GOA would be a significant factor in
a reasonable shareholder's decision whether or not to vote for the merger. If
Skogmo in fact intended to continue the outdoor advertising business of GOA
despite the poor earnings picture, as the Proxy Statement indicated, a reasonable GOA stockholder might well have opted for the down-side protection of
the Skogmo convertible preferred stock and been willing to give up some of his
interest in the potential plant sales profits, which, it may have appeared, might
never be realized. On the other hand, if the Proxy Statement had adequately
disclosed Skogmo's true intention to seek to dispose of all the remaining outdoor advertising plants as soon as possible, and its expectation that it could do
this on favorable terms, the same stockholder would have realized that there
was substantially less risk involved in retaining his GOA stock and would have
been more likely to focus on the profits available from the sales of the plants.
Id. at 1302-03.
42. Id. at 1291.
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made by a qualified expert and have a
disclosed if they had been
43
sufficient basis in fact."
On appeal the Second Circuit reversed the lower court's decision. As to the district court's findings on the appraisal disclosure
issue, the Second Circuit attacked the significance of the SEC's amicus brief. First, the circuit court argued that the SEC in its brief in
effect reaffirmed the Commission's long-standing policy against the
disclosure of appraisals.4 4 Second, the court severely criticized the
precedent upon which the SEC principally relied for its position
favoring disclosure. The SEC cited Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,4
which dealt with an inventory of a commodity (tobacco) about to be
liquidated by the buyer of Axton-Fisher.4 6 The circuit court distinguished Speed from the present case, explaining that tobacco was actually traded in the open market, and, therefore, its value was easily
ascertainable. 4 1 Since no market value appraisal was necessary in
Speed and the case did not involve proxy statements or the SEC's
policy of not allowing the disclosure of appraisals in proxy materials,4" the court believed that Speed was factually irrelevant: "As has
been correctly said, 'No one, the Commission included, has seriously believed that the Speed case stands for the general proposition
43. Id. at 1292. The SEC prefaced this new policy by stating that disclosure is only
required in the following situations:
When a balance sheet in a proxy statement for a merger reflects assets of an
amount that is substantially lower than their current liquidating value, and liquidation of those assets is intended or can reasonably be anticipated, the textual or narrative portion of the proxy statement must contain whatever
available material information about their current liquidating value is necessary
to make the proxy statement not misleading.
Id. at 1291.
44. Id. at 1291-93. The court stated that although the note to rule 14a-9 does not
specifically refer to asset appraisals as a possible type of misleading information, the
policy embodied in the note has consistently been enforced to bar disclosure of asset
appraisals as well as future market values, earnings, or dividends. As support, the court
cited to the following excerpt from the Commission's brief:
The Commission and its staff have traditionally looked with suspicion upon
the inclusion of asset appraisals even in the text or narrative portion of proxy
statements. It has been our experience that such appraisals are often unfounded or unreliable. For this reason, the Commission's staff, on a case-bycase basis, has usually requested the deletion of appraisals that have been included in proxy statements.
Id. at 1292-93 (citing Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae, Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973)).
45. 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), modified and aff'd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
46. Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1293.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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that appraisals of assets must be disclosed to the shareholders.' ""
Finally, while recognizing the change in SEC soft information
policy, the court stated that the policy in effect at the time of the
1963 proxy statement was applicable and not any ex post facto modification. 5 ° In 1963 the Commission had a definite policy against
disclosure of asset appraisals in proxy statements. The court further
noted that at the time of the 1963 proxy statement the Commission's examiners were "trained to strike at appraisal values as unacceptable whenever they read them in documents filed with the
Commission.""
The Gerstle court took particular pains to explain its refusal to
apply the SEC's new policies. It commented that such changes
should be promulgated by rule or statement of policy rather than by
amicus brief. 2 Further, the court noted the unfairness of retroactive application in light of the long-standing assumption among lawyers specializing in the securities field that appraisals of assets could
not be included in a proxy statement. 53 In support of its finding of
no duty to disclose, the court cited section 23(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act for protecting Gerstle's reliance on SEC policy as it
appeared in 1963." 4
In discussing the second issue on appeal, Gamble-Skogmo's intent to sell the remaining plants after the merger, the court agreed
with the district court that disclosure of this information was necessary. The court differentiated between factual and soft information
disclosure.
According to the court, factual information does not
allow any potential overstatement of future business prospects-a
major factor in alarming the SEC about appraisals.5 6 The court
found the intent to sell sufficiently factual and material 57 to mandate
49. Id. (quoting Mann, Accounting and Administrative Law Aspects of Gerstle v. GambleSkogmo, Inc., 15 N.Y.L.F. 304, 323 (1969)).
50. Id. at 1294.
51. Id. at 1293.
52. Id. at 1294.
53. Id. at 1293. The Commission admitted that its branch chief, in reviewing the
Gamble-Skogmo proxy statement, had enforced this policy by refusing to consider disclosure of the asset appraisals. Id.
54. Id. at 1294. Section 23(a) of the Securities Exchange Act provides that "[n]o
provision of this chapter imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or omitted in
good faith in conformity with a rule, regulation, or order of the Commission .
15
U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (1982).
55. Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1294-95.
56. Id. at 1295.
57. Id. at 1301-02. The court applied the materiality test enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), which stated
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disclosure of that information. 5"
The Seventh Circuit's position on soft information disclosure is
reflected in Panterv. Marshall Field & Co. , which held that there is
no duty to disclose such information.6 ° The plaintiffs, who were
stockholders of Marshall Field, claimed that Marshall Field's "rosy"
projections for future growth misled them. Marshall Field published the projections in two press releases and a letter disseminated
to stockholders in December 1977. At the same time Carter Hawley
Hale threatened a hostile takeover of Marshall Field.6 The plaintiffs alleged violations of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 62 and
section 14(e) of the Williams Act. 6 ' They claimed that the press releases and in particular the letter, which cited a thirteen percent increase in consolidated net income of the company before ventures
and taxes, materially misled shareholders in light of the company's
that a misstatement or omission was material if a reasonable stockholder might have
considered it important in deciding how to vote. Id. at 384.
58. Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1301-02.
59. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981).
60. Panter's factual situation dealt with earning projections; however, the court made
it clear that its position related to "projections," "estimates," and "other information."
Id. at 292. See also Kademian v. Ladish Co., 792 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying Panter
in holding that internal valuation studies prepared for use during merger negotiations
need not be disclosed); Bradshaw v. Jenkins, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 99,719 (W.D. Wash. 1984) (citing Panterfor proposition that courts have
consistently discouraged the inclusion of predictive information in proxy statements).
61. Panter, 646 F.2d at 291.
62. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act prohibits the use "in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security ... [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe .... " 15
U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
Pursuant to this section, the SEC promulgated rule lOb-5, which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
63. Section 14(e) of the Williams Act provides in part that:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer. ...
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
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undisclosed "five-year projection plan."'6 4 The plan, an internally
prepared document, showed an anticipated decline of seven percent
in consolidated net income for the year.6 5
The court held that Marshall Field had no duty to disclose financial projections.6 6 The court noted an exception, however,
when the company has already partially disclosed such information.
It explained that the duty to disclose fully all the facts arises in this
67
situation, if necessary to avoid making such statements misleading.
Even if this duty did arise, though, the court noted that the projections, estimates, and other information disclosed required a reasonable basis.6 8
Arguably, Marshall Field had a duty to disclose its five-year plan
because its letter had "partially disclosed" the information relating
to the expected thirteen percent increase. The court, however, did
not impose liability because the "highly tentative" projections
lacked reasonable certainty. 6 9 In support of this conclusion, the
court relied heavily on the fact that the five-year plan constituted
one of a series of plans updated and prepared for internal use
only.7" Additionally, release of the report might have been actionable as still too "rosy" when compared with the company's actual
year-end earnings, which declined twenty-five percent from the
1
prior year.

7

B.

The Third Circuit-An Unintended Dual Approach

The Third Circuit's current position on the duty to disclose soft
information is enunciated in Flynn v. Bass Brothers Enterprises.72 However, a prior case, Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc. ,"s may still be

authoritative in some situations. Both cases, therefore, warrant
discussion.
The facts in Flynn arose when Prochemco, Inc. attempted to
64. Panter,646 F.2d at 292.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 293 (citing Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 199-200 (7th Cir. 1978)).
67. Id. at 292 (citing Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 292-93 (citing Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214, 1221 (9th Cir.
1980) (financial projections not required to be disclosed)).
70. Panter, 646 F.2d at 292-93.
71. Id.
72. 744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984). The Flynn opinion enunciated a standard for disclosure of asset valuations and other soft information. The standard is often referred to
as the "totality of the circumstances" approach. See id. at 988.
73. 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
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purchase a controlling share of National Alfalfa.7 4 To finance the
purchase Prochemco approached Bass Brothers in the hope of acquiring a loan. 75 To present its proposal to Bass Brothers and other
potential funding sources Prochemco prepared two reports on National Alfalfa's history and operations. Those reports included an
appraisal of National Alfalfa's assets based on alternative hypothetical valuations. 76 Bass Brothers refused to participate, but later
purchased its own controlling share of National Alfalfa after
Prochemco failed to find financing for the purchase.7 7
In March 1976 Bass Brothers announced a tender offer for the
remaining shares of National Alfalfa at $6.45.78 In making its tender
offer, Bass Brothers did not disclose the asset valuations contained
in the Prochemco reports.7 9 Instead, Bass Brothers represented in
its tender offer that the "offeror did not receive any material nonpublic information from [National Alfalfa] with respect to its prior
acquisition of shares nor ... does it presently possess any such information."" 0 In a supplement to the tender offer Bass Brothers
did, however, reveal that the liquidated value of the shares could
well be significantly higher than the price offered."
74. Flynn, 744 F.2d at 981.
75. Id.
76. These reports stated: "$6.40 could be realized through 'liquidation [of National
Alfalfa] under stress conditions'; $12.40 could be realized through 'liquidation in an
orderly fashion over a reasonable period of time'; $16.40 represented National Alfalfa's
value 'as [an] ongoing venture.' " Id. at 982.
77. Bass Brothers purchased 52% of company stock at $6.47 per share from National Alfalfa's former president. Id. at 981.
78. At the time of the tender offer, Bass Brothers had increased its holdings in National Alfalfa to 61.2% through a prior privately negotiated purchase of an additional
9% of the company's stock at $6.45 per share. Id. at 982.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. The supplement stated:
While the Offeror has made no independent appraisal of the value of the Company's land and makes no representation with respect thereto, in view of the
foregoing factors the aggregate current fair market value of the Company's agricultural land may be substantially higher than its original cost as reflected on
the books of the Company. Depending upon the respective market values for
such land, stockholders could receive, upon liquidation of the Company, an
amount per share significantly higher than the current book value and possibly
higher than the price of $6.45 per Share offered by Offeror in the Offer. The
amount received by stockholders upon liquidation of the Company would also
be dependent upon, among other things, the market value of the Company's
other assets and the length of time allowed for such liquidation. The Offeror
has no reason to believe that the Company's management has any present intention of liquidating the Company. As noted on page 8 of the Offer to
Purchase under "Purpose of This Offer: Present Relationship of Company and
Offeror," Offeror does not currently intend to liquidate the Company.
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Several months later, in June 1976, former minority stockholders of National Alfalfa filed a class action suit alleging that Bass
Brothers violated section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, section 14(e)
of the Williams Act, and rule 10b-5 by failing to disclose the
Prochemco reports in connection with the tender offer.8 2 Specifically, the stockholders maintained that Bass Brothers had a duty to
disclose the asset appraisals because that information was material
to National Alfalfa's stockholders in making an informed decision
on whether to tender their shares.
The district court granted defendant's motion for a directed
verdict, finding that the information provided in the tender offer
was not materially misleading. The court explained that the information contained in the Prochemco report lacked a sufficient factual
basis and, therefore, was not the type of disclosure normally permitted to shareholders.8 3 In addressing the asset disclosure issue on
appeal, the Third Circuit stated that it was necessary first to find a
duty to speak before requiring disclosure of such information. The
court explained that "where a 'duty to speak' exists ... federal securities law requires the disclosure of any 'material fact' in connection with the purchase or sale of a security under rule lOb-5 or the
tendering of an offer under section 14(e). ' ' 4 Without defining the
particular circumstance under which a duty to speak arises, the court
found this requirement easily satisfied under the facts. Bass Brothers did not deny that at the time of the tender offer it had a duty to
make disclosures in its capacity as a majority stockholder of National
Alfalfa as well as in its capacity as a tender offeror."s
The court next focused its attention on the materiality of the
asset valuation omissions.8 6 In defining materiality the court
adopted the TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc. 87 test, applicable in both
Id. at 982.
82. See supra notes 62-63.
83. Flynn, 744 F.2d at 983.
84. Id. at 984 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (holding
that the duty to disclose inside information depends upon special relation between
buyer and seller); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1202, 1205 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that tender offeror has no duty to disclose preliminary merger discussions when
plans are indefinite)).
85. Flynn, 744 F.2d at 984. One commentator posits that the "duty to speak" arises
only upon a specific statutory specification, or in the context of the antifraud provisions,
upon a purchase, sale or statement. See Note, Mandatory Disclosuresof Soft Information in the
Market for Corporate Control, 35 EMORY L.J. 213, 224-25 (1986).
86. The court stated the issue was "whether the alleged nondisclosures were material omissions and thus breached the duty to disclose." Flynn, 744 F.2d at 984.
87. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). In TSC Industries the Supreme Court held that an omit-
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rule lOb-5 and section 14(e) cases.88
In discussing the materiality issue the circuit court first surveyed past and present SEC policy, concluding that in recent years
the SEC policy had begun to favor more disclosure of soft information.89 The court pointed out that the evolution in SEC policy was a
reaction to increased mergers, proxy contests, and tender offers,
which engender the need for more information, whether it be hard
or soft.9 0 The rationale for the SEC's initial prohibition of soft information disclosure-the fear of purchaser reliance on overly optimistic claims by management 9 1- had produced an unintended and
unfortunate result: the nondisclosure of valuable information for
stockholders faced with the choice of selling or exchanging their
shares in a tender offer or merger.9" When the SEC initially formulated its policy on nondisclosure of soft information, the "present
spate of proxy contests and tender offers was not anticipated.... .,o"
Recognizing the SEC's new policy regarding disclosure of soft
information, the Flynn court decided to formulate a new approach
that would be concomitant with present SEC policy. First, the court
ted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding how to vote.
88. The court explained: "This definition of 'material' has been adopted for cases
involving rule lOb-5 and we see no reason not to utilize the same formulation for evaluating materiality in the context of a tender offer." Flynn, 744 F.2d at 985 (citing Radol v.
Thomas, 556 F. Supp. 586, 593 n.15 (S.D. Ohio 1983), aff'd, 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3272 (1986) (employing the TSC Industries formulation of
materiality in § 14(e) and rule lOb-5 cases)). Flynn also cited Staffin v. Greenberg, 672
F.2d 1196, 1205 (3d Cir. 1982); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 282 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
89. Flynn, 744 F.2d at 986-87. The court mentioned the SEC's 1976 deletion of future earnings from the note to rule 14a-9, which lists examples of potentially misleading
disclosures. Id. See Securities Act Release No. 5699, supra note 15; SEC rule 175, Safe
Harbor For Forward Looking Projections, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1986); Exchange Act
Release No. 16,833, supra note 24 (authorizing disclosure of good faith appraisals made
on a reasonable basis in proxy contests in which a principal issue is the liquidation of all
or a portion of a target company's assets). For a discussion of each of the items above,
see supra Section I of this article.
90. Flynn, 744 F.2d at 986-87.
91. Id. at 987.
92. Id. See Kripke, Rule lOb-5 Liability and "Material" "Facts," 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1061,

1071 (1971).
93. Flynn, 744 F.2d at 987. The court attempted to develop a new approach that was
clearly in step with current SEC policy instead of one that retarded the evolution of the
law by reflecting only past and outdated SEC policy. The court explained that other
circuits had not modernized their approaches because of the time lag between the issuance of a challenged tender offer or proxy statement and when a trial or appellate court
rendered a decision. Id. at 987 (citing Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281
(2d Cir. 1973)).
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ruled that asset appraisals, as a matter of law, were not immaterial.9 4
Second, it found that in appropriate cases disclosure of such information was mandatory.9 5 In determining which situations called for
mandatory disclosure of soft information, the court adopted a caseby-case approach. This determination could be accomplished:
by weighing the potential aid such information will give a
shareholder against the potential harm, such as undue reliance, if the information is released with a proper cautionary note.
The factors a court must consider in making such a determination are: the facts upon which the information is
based; the qualifications of those who prepared or compiled it; the purpose for which the information was originally intended; its relevance to the stockholder's
impending decisions; the degree of subjectivity or bias reflected in its preparation; the degree to which the information is unique; and the availability to the investor of other
more reliable sources of information.9 6
The Third Circuit, however, refused to apply its new standard retroactively. 97 Instead, it applied the law prevailing in 1976,98 the time
of the alleged violation.
Prior to Flynn, the Third Circuit's leading case on the disclosure
of soft information was Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc.9 9 The
Kohn case involved the proposed amalgamation of two mining corporations, Roan Selection Trust Limited (RST), a Zambian corporation, into American Metal Climax (AMAX), a New York corporation
and controlling stockholder of RST. 10° The plaintiff, a representa94. Id. at 988.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. The court noted "that despite our formulation of the current law applicable to
corporate disclosure, we are constrained by the significant development in disclosure
law since 1976 not to apply the announced standard retroactively but to evaluate the
defendants' conduct by the standards which prevailed in 1976." Id.
The rationale for the court's decision against retroactive application is supported by
similar findings in other cases. Id. at 986 n.l I (citing South Coast Servs. Corp. v. Santa
Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d 1265, 1271-72 (9th Cir. 1982)) (see infra notes 22737 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.,
646 F.2d 271, 292-93 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Gerstle v. GambleSkogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1292-94 (2d Cir. 1973); Kohn v. American Metal Climax,
Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 265 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
98. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text for details on SEC policy at this
time. In general, SEC policy still discouraged the disclosure of soft information.
99. 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1982).
100. Id. at 259.

1987]

WALK THROUGH THE CIRCUITS

1087

tive of certain RST stockholders, sued under section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and rule lOb-5, alleging that the proxy materials soliciting stockholder votes on the proposed amalgamation failed to provide material information including the value of RST's assets.' O'
The district court agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that a
"clear presentation of the values assigned to RST assets.., and the
basis upon which the evaluations were made were crucial to an informed shareholder vote and omission of these facts ... was material."' 2 Moreover, the district court suggested that the omission of
the asset values was intentional, as they had0 3been substantially undervalued in the AMAX-RST negotiations.1
On appeal the Third Circuit strongly disagreed with the district
court's finding on the materiality of the omission. In holding that
such a conclusion constituted reversible error, the circuit court
never discussed whether the asset valuations were in fact material.
Instead, the court pointed to traditional SEC policy as discouraging
the disclosure of this type of information in proxy materials. Additionally, the court found that the asset values, a product of the negotiations concerning the amalgamation, were unreliable and,
therefore, suspect.' 0 4
In applying the Kohn holding to the Flynn case, the Third Circuit emphasized the broad reach of Kohn to all types of soft information. ' 5 Citing Kohn, the court stated: "This court in the past has
101. Id. at 260.
102. Id. at 265.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. The Kohn case has been quoted extensively for the position that such information
is not required to be disclosed. See, e.g., Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d
761, 775 n.12 (3d Cir. 1976) (no duty to disclose valuation predictions); Staffin v.
Greenberg, 509 F. Supp. 825, 837 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982)
(tender offeror has no duty to disclose preliminary merger discussions when plans are
indefinite); see also Dower v. Mosser, 648 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1981) (not citing Kohn but
expressly adopting its position-no duty to disclose future projections). Two district
court cases, Alaska Interstate Co. v. McMillan, 402 F. Supp. 532 (D. Del. 1975), and
Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812 (D. Del. 1974), cited to Kohn
but developed their own tests.
The Denison case involved the failure to disclose asset valuations in a proxy statement. The court developed a balancing test to ascertain whether disclosure was required. The court weighed the value and reliability of the data against the potential for
misinterpretation in its communication. 388 F. Supp. at 820.
In Alaska Interstate the acquiring company, over the objection of the target, included,
with proper disclaimers and cautionary remarks, a range of hypothetical liquidation values made by the target's management. The court approved the release of the valuations
in spite of the "general rule" discouraging such disclosure. It went on to note that soft
information disclosure may even be required depending on certain factors such as
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followed the 'general rule' that presentations of future earnings, appraised asset valuations and other hypothetical data are to be discouraged."'0 6 Following Kohn's holding, the Third Circuit found
that the appraisal reports in Flynn were unreliable 0 7 because experts did not prepare them,' 0 8 they were virtually "selling documents,"' 10 9 and not adequately based in fact." 0 Additionally, the
court concluded that the plaintiff failed to advance enough evidence
showing that Bass Brothers relied on the appraisals."' Any omission of these reports was, therefore, not actionable.
What is the impact of Kohn and Flynn on cases that come up for
review after the Flynn decision? Even though the Third Circuit
strongly urged application of the Flynn criteria, both retroactively
and prospectively, some courts since Flynn have viewed the Third
Circuit as having two tests applicable to the disclosure of soft information. For cases having factual situations arising prior to the Flynn
holding, Kohn has been applied, finding no duty to disclose soft in(1) the importance of the information; (2) the amount of subjective judgment which the
information reflects; (3) the practical difficulties in fashioning a disclosure which would
not create "more potential for misunderstanding than enlightenment..."; (4) the purpose of its preparation; and (5) whether the information indicated a trend substantially
different from that reflected in publicly available information. 402 F. Supp. at 567-68
(quoting Denison Mines Ltd., 388 F. Supp. at 819).
106. Flynn, 744 F.2d at 986.
107. Id. In assessing the reliability of the asset valuations, the Flynn court applied the
following factors: the qualifications of those who prepared or compiled the appraisal;
the degree of certainty of the data; the reason for the preparation of the report; and
evidence of reliance on the appraisal. Id. The court cited several cases that emphasized
these factors in their decisions: Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981) (finding no need to disclose "tentative estimates
prepared for the enlightenment of management with no expectation that they be made
public"); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 265 (3d Cir. 1972) (not
requiring disclosure of appraisals that were "advanced by parties during negotiation
only and as part of their bargaining strategies"); Radol v. Thomas, 556 F. Supp. 586,
588 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (finding that reports "intended to be 'selling documents' for use
in attracting more favorable tender offer" are less reliable), aff'd, 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 3272 (1986). For examples of courts that considered, in
particular, the element of reliance on appraisals, see South Coast Servs. Corp. v. Santa
Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d 1265, 1272 (9th Cir. 1982); Gerstle v. GambleSkogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1292-94 (2d Cir. 1973).
108. The court concluded that although Prochemco did have experience in acquisitions, there was little evidence of the company's expertise in appraising assets such as
the type of land involved in the case. Flynn, 744 F.2d at 988-89.
109. The purpose of the reports was to attract financing for Prochemco's purchase of
National Alfalfa stock. Id. at 989.
110. There was no clear evidence establishing who specifically prepared the reports or
the data used in making the valuations. Id.
111. The court commented that reliance on these reports would be insufficient to
mandate disclosure in the Flynn case. Id.
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formation.'12 Post-Flynn factual scenarios, however, would call for
application of the Flynn criteria by the Third Circuit and those
courts wishing to follow its lead.'3 This unintended' 14 dual approach is a result of the Third Circuit's refusal in Flynn to apply its
5
own criteria retroactively."
C.

The Fourth Circuit: An Approach Dependent on the
Type of Soft Information

The Fourth Circuit recently decided two cases, Lockspeiser v.
Western Maryland Co. 116 and Walker v. Action Industries,' 7 dealing with
the issue of mandatory disclosure of soft information. In Walker, the
more recent case, the Fourth Circuit made it clear that the application of either the Walker standard or the Lockspeiser standard would
8
depend on the type of soft information in question."
Lockspeiser involved a merger of Western Maryland, a timber
and mineral leasing concern, into CSX Minerals, Inc., a whollyowned subsidiary of CSX Corporation. 1 9 Stockholders of Western
Maryland received a proxy statement concerning the proposed
merger. 120 A stockholder of Western Maryland brought suit alleging that the proxy statement was misleading under sections 10(b)
and 14(a) of the Exchange Act. 1 2 ' The proxy statement omitted information relating to the number of tons of coal reserves and the
amount of standing board feet of timber, Western Maryland's two
22
most valuable assets. 1

Finding the omission immaterial, the district court dismissed
112. See, e.g., Walker v. Action Indus., 802 F.2d 703, 708 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 952 (1987); and Fickinger v. C.I. Planning Corp., 646 F. Supp. 622, 628 (E.D.
Penn. 1986) (no duty to disclose real estate appraisals and rental projections), stating
that "Flynn standards are not applied retroactively" and citing Kohn as authority for the
Third Circuit's pre-Flynn position.
113. See, e.g., Hecco Ventures v. Avalon Energy Corp., 606 F. Supp. 512, 520
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
114. The circuit court in Flynn in fact urged other courts to apply its criteria to factual
situations arising both before and after its holding. Flynn, 744 F.2d at 988.
115. See Walker, 802 F.2d at 708; Fickinger, 646 F. Supp. 622, 628 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
116. 768 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1985).
117. 802 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 952 (1987).
118. The Walker court refused to apply the Lockspeiser holding (duty to disclose information relating to coal reserves and amount of standing board feet of timber in a proxy
statement) to financial projections and asset valuations, stating that the two cases were
factually different. Id. at 709.
119. Lockspeiser, 768 F.2d at 559.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 39 and 62.
122. Lockspeiser, 768 F.2d at 560.
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the stockholder's claim. 12 3 On appeal the circuit court found the
issue of materiality to be a question for the trier of fact. 12 4 Furthermore, the court cited the TSC Industries materiality test as the applicable standard. 25 The appellees argued vigorously against any
application of a materiality test and posited that disclosure of tonnage and board feet estimates would violate the federal securities
laws. Western Maryland supported its argument by citing Kohn for
the proposition that the SEC and the courts discouraged disclosure
of asset valuations in proxy materials.' 26 Distinguishing Kohn on its
facts, 12 7 the Fourth Circuit refused to apply that case because it did
not involve reserve disclosure. 128 Furthermore, the court noted
Kohn's modification by Flynn. 129 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case, stating that the trier of fact should determine
whether the omissions were material in accordance with the test pre0
scribed in TSC Industries.13
The second noteworthy case in the Fourth Circuit, Walker v. Action Industries,13 1 involved financial projections. A former stockholder of Action Industries brought suit against Action alleging
violations of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 based on material omissions in a self-tender-offer statement and a press release issued by
Action in 1982.132 On appeal Walker challenged the jury's verdict
123. Id.
124. The court noted that Western Maryland minority shareholders had the choice of
accepting the offer for purchase of the stock or instituting a state proceeding for appraisal. Since no established market existed for the company's stock and there was no
independent valuation of the assets, information about timber and coal reserves was
significant to stockholders in making their choice. Id. at 561.
125. The court observed that sections 10(b) and 14(a) shared the same standard of
materiality. Lockspeiser, 768 F.2d at 562 (citing TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. at
445-46 n.8; Seaboard World Airlines v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355, 361 n.8 (2d Cir.
1979)). For a statement of the test, see supra note 87.
126. Lockspeiser, 768 F.2d at 560-61 (citing Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458
F.2d 255, 265 (3d Cir. 1972)). Appellees also cited Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d
1214, 1221 (9th Cir. 1980), which held that disclosure of financial projections was not
required. The court distinguished this case on its facts. Lockspeiser, 768 F.2d at 561.
127. Lockspeiser, 768 F.2d at 561. In Kohn the court did not require disclosure of asset
valuations advanced by parties during negotiations as a part of bargaining strategy. For
further discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 99-104.
128. Lockspeiser, 768 F.2d at 561.
129. Id. Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., 744 F.2d 978, 988 (3d Cir. 1984), modified the
Third Circuit's position in Kohn that disclosure of asset valuations and other soft information is to be discouraged and held that in appropriate cases disclosure is required.
130. Lockspeiser, 768 F.2d at 562. At the time of the writing of this article, the district
court had not heard the case on remand.
131. 802 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 952 (1987).
132. Id. at 704-05. On July 16, 1982, Action made a tender offer to purchase 15% of
its common stock at $4.00 per share until August 6th of that year. In connection with
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against the lOb-5 action, claiming the lower court erred in its indisstruction to the jury that "there is no duty on a corporation to
133
close future projections. However, it can do so voluntarily."'
Walker argued that a proper instruction would have informed
the jury that Action had a duty to disclose its financial projections
for fiscal 1983 as well as its actual orders and sales for the same
period.'" 4 The press release, based on audited financial statements,
and the statements themselves virtually confirmed the statements
made in section 14B of Action's tender offer statement.' 3 5 Essentially, the release and statements reported increased sales and deinternal reports, however, reflected
creased earnings.' 36 Action's
37
news.1
financial
different
the tender offer, Action issued a tender offer statement as required pursuant to rule 13e4. Rule 13e-4 establishes filing and disclosure requirements for tender offers by a reporting company for its own shares. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (1986). Action's tender offer statement was conditionally admitted into evidence and discussed at trial. At the
close of plaintiff's case, however, the district court struck the tender offer statement
from the evidence and instructed the jury that only the alleged omissions in the press
release were actionable. Walker, 802 F.2d at 706 n.5. Action issued the press release on
August 18, 1982, after the tender offer had terminated. Basically, the press release confirmed the information set forth by Action in its tender offer statement. Id. at 705.
133. Walker, 802 F.2d at 707.
134. Id. Action's fiscal year ran from July through June. Because its 1982 fiscal year
had just ended, audited financial statements for that year as well as the first quarter of
1983 were unavailable at the time of the tender offer and August 18th press release.
The tender offer statement did, however, disclose audited financial statements for fiscal
years 1979, 1980, and 1981. These figures revealed a net loss of $2,306,900 in fiscal
1979, net earnings of $372,000 in fiscal 1980, and net earnings of $731,000 in fiscal
1981. Id. at 704. Additionally, Action disclosed unaudited, interim financial statements
for fiscal 1982 through March 27, 1982, the end of Action's third quarter. These figures
showed a net loss of $4,014,900 as compared with net earnings of $1,037,600 for the
same period in the previous year. Id.
135. Id. at 705. Pursuant to § 14B of Action's tender offer statement, a segment entitled "Events Subsequent to March 27, 1982," Action stated in part:
The Company's fiscal year ended on June 26, 1982. Although financial statements have not been prepared or audited, the Company expects results from
continuing operations to reflect a sales increase compared with the prior year.
However, earnings from continuing operations are estimated to be somewhat
lower than last year as a result of lower gross margins on sales and higher operating expenses.
Id. at 704-05.
136. Id. at 705.
137. Action regularly prepared several types of reports for internal use. A weekly
"work projections report" recorded actual orders and identified them as "firm" or "anticipated" depending on their likelihood of cancellation. Monthly "gross sales forecasts" projected both monthly and quarterly sales based on the orders reflected in the
weekly work projections. Additionally, Action reported actual financial results in weekly
"flash sales reports," which showed sales for the current week, month-to-date sales, and
quarter-to-date sales. Id.
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Prior to Action's tender offer, as early as May 1982, Action's
internal financial reports indicated substantial increases in orders
and projected sales for the first quarter of fiscal year 1983. As the
July tender offer neared and the first quarter of fiscal year 1983 began, subsequent internal reports indicated even greater increases in
actual orders and projected sales, as well as increases in actual sales
over the prior year. Action, however, did not disclose these reports
38
in its tender offer statement.1
Subsequent to Action's tender offer and up until the August 18
press release, the company's internal reports continued to show
substantial increases in projected sales, actual orders, and actual
sales for the first quarter of 1983. The company's press release did
not include these projected increases." 9 Concluding from the August 18 press release that the company's prospects were not
favorable, Walker sold all of his Action shares on September 21,
1982, at $5.25 per share.' 40 Subsequently, on October 28, Action
announced its first-quarter financial results. The company reported
sales seventy-five percent above the one million in sales reported
over the same period in the previous year. The company's stock
traded the following day as high as 9-7/8 and reached a peak of 153/4 per share by November 12, 1982.'
In assessing Walker's argument-required disclosure of the financial projections-the court determined that before the issue of
materiality is reached 42 in a lOb-5 action concerning omissions, a
duty to speak must first be established. 143 The court specifically refused to adopt any of the various approaches used by other circuits
on the duty to disclose soft information. 4 4 By using its own approach the Walker court effectively side-stepped any question concerning the materiality of Action's 1983 financial projections. Since
the court concluded that Action had no duty to speak, it was unnecessary to go further in its analysis. Four arguments figured prominently in this finding.
First, the court noted the SEC's failure to impose a duty to dis138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. Walker did not tender any of his shares to Action in its tender offer.
141. Id.
142. The court cited the TSC Industries test as the applicable standard in rule lob-5
cases. Id. at 706 n.6.
143. Id. at 706 (citing Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 238 (6th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986); Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., 744 F.2d 978, 984
(3d Cir. 1984)).
144. Id. at 709 n.ll.
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close financial projections in rule 13e-4 tender offer statements.1 4 5
Extending this rationale to Action the court stated: "It follows that
there was a similar absence of any express duty to disclose financial
projections in the'. . . press release. "146
Second, the SEC had not imposed a duty to disclose financial
projections in disclosure documents in general. Recognizing that
the SEC's disclosure policy on soft information had changed from
one of nondisclosure to permissiveness, the court perceived the current SEC environment as "experimental" and "evolutionary." Any
further transition in policy from permissiveness to mandatory disclosure, in the court's view, needed SEC or congressional
approval. 147
Third, the court made clear its reluctance to recognize a duty to
disclose the particular financial projections in Walker 148 because of
their uncertainty and potential to mislead investors. The court referred to the volatility of the projections and compared the actual
sales increases with those projected for the quarter.' 4 9 In light of
the disparity between actual and projected sales, the court concluded that Walker might have sued Action if it had disclosed such
50
overly optimistic information.
Finally, the court viewed the required disclosure of the projections as impractical. Referring once again to the frequency and volatility of these projections, the court found that the "imposition
of a duty to disclose . . . would have required virtually constant
statements by Action in order not to mislead investors. Under these
circumstances . . . projection [was] impractical, if not
unreasonable."l51
In summarizing its position, the court noted that its holding did
not pertain to the disclosure of financial projections in all circum1 52
stances, only to the particular circumstances of the Walker case.
145. Id. at 709.
146. Id.
147. Id.

148. Id. The court did not state that this reason applied to the disclosure of financial
projections in general.
149. Id. The court explained that monthly projections were changing constantly with
each new projection, rendering the last one incorrect. For example, the court cited the
May and June projections, arguing that the disclosure of either one would have grossly
understated subsequent projections. Id. at 709-10.
150. Id. at 710.
151. Id.
152. Id. The court went on to state that its holding was not intended to discourage
disclosure of financial projections. Instead the court voiced its support of voluntary disclosure of soft information made pursuant to rule 175. Id.
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The court, however, refused to discuss under what circumstances a
duty to speak would arise. Consequently, the court did not address
the application of the TSC Industries materiality test if such a duty did
exist.
In summary, the Fourth Circuit's position on soft information
disclosure disfavors disclosure of financial projections while requiring the disclosure of reserve information, if material.'
Although
the Walker court noted that its holding did not pertain to financial
projections in general, one reason upon which it relied in finding no
duty to disclose applies to all financial projection cases and to cases
involving other types of soft information disclosure, including asset
valuations: the decision to wait for an SEC mandate and not to second-guess the SEC while its policies are in transition.
D.

The Sixth Circuit- The Substantially Certain to Hold Test

The Sixth Circuit enunciated its position on the duty to disclose
soft information in Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co.i54 Radol v. Thomas 155
confirmed and applied this standard. Both cases involved the same
general fact situation. Since both cases came down on the same day
and in order to give full discussion to the Starkman test, it is necessary to discuss these cases together, noting both their similarities
and differences.
1. The Common Factual Scenario.-In the summer of 1981 Marathon Oil Company became a prime potential takeover target. Marathon's stock was grossly undervalued' 5 6 compared with the
153. Lockspeiser is significant not only for its refusal to apply traditional SEC policy but
also its recognition that under certain circumstances disclosure of reserve information is
not required but may be if it is material under the TSC Industries test. The holding in
Lockspeiser is probably confined to the disclosure of reserve information. See supra note
118.
154. 772 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986).
155. 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3272 (1986). The court in
Radol said that Starkman merely reaffirmed its prior decisions on the subject. Id. at 252.
See Biechele v. Cedar Point, Inc., 747 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding no duty to disclose financial projections that were little more than predictions of future business success);James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 587 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1978) (finding earning figures
material only when calculated with substantial certainty); Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533
F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977) (holding failure to disclose
projections of future earnings in a freeze-out merger proxy statement not actionable);
Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414 (6th Cir.) (holding corporate insider not required to disclose educated guesses or predictions), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974).
156. For example, the company's stock was trading at around $63.75, in comparison
with appraisal reports that had valued the stock at a much higher level. Starkman, 772
F.2d at 234-35.
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company's ownership of substantial long-term oil and gas fields.
These holdings included the Yates field in west Texas, one of the
57
largest and most productive oil fields ever discovered.
In view of the strong possibility of a takeover, Marathon's top
level management met and began to prepare defensive tactics
against a hostile takeover bid. The company prepared an internal
asset valuation report known as the Strong report.' 5 8 The report
estimated the value of Marathon's transportation, refining, marketing, equipment, and structural assets, as well as the value of proven,
probable, and potential oil reserves,' 5 9 including exploratory
acreage.
The basis for the Strong report's estimates of all three types of
reserves was not available to the general public. The valuation of
the reserves involved the use of a discounted cash-flow methodology. 6 ' This valuation method, a standard procedure used for determining the cash value of oil and gas properties, required
projections of price and cost conditions twenty years into the future.16' Based on this methodology, the Strong report valued Marathon's net assets at between $16 billion and $19 billion. 62 This
resulted in a per-share value between $276 and $323. The value of
the oil and gas reserves made up $14 billion of the $19 billion esti63
mate and $11.5 billion of the $16 billion estimate.'
In addition to the Strong report, First Boston, at Marathon's
request, prepared a similar report. First Boston, an investment
banking firm, based its report upon only proven and probable oil
reserves. Like the Strong report, First Boston's report constituted a
"presentation piece," used only to attract the interest of prospective
157. Radol, 772 F.2d at 247.
158. Harold Hoopman, Marathon's President and CEO, instructed the company's
vice presidents to compile a catalog of assets. He and his aide, John Strong, were responsible for combining the information received from the company's various divisions
into the final report. Starkman, 772 F.2d at 234.
159. The Strong Report defined "proven reserves" as those actually producing,
"probable reserves" as reserves for properties where some production had been established and additional production was likely, and "potential reserves" as reserves for
properties where production had not yet been established but where geologic evidence
supported wildcat drilling. Id.
160. Using the discounted cash-flow methodology, the present value of oil reserves is
calculated by summing risk-discounted expected net revenues from the particular field
over the life of the field, and then discounted into present value by the use of an estimated interest rate. Id.
161. Id.
162. A range of asset valuation existed because different interest rates were used to
discount back to present value. Id.
163. Id.
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bidders for Marathon if a hostile tender offer occurred. 164 The First
Boston report placed Marathon's value between $188 and $225 per
share. 1 65 Marathon's market value, however, was well below these
appraisals.' 66 On October 30, 1981, the day before Mobil announced a hostile takeover bid for Marathon Oil, Marathon stock
16 7
closed at $63.75 per share.

Mobil's proposed acquisition of Marathon involved two steps.
The first step involved a tender offer for up to sixty-eight percent of
Marathon's common stock at $85 per share in cash. The second and
final step, a going-private, freeze-out merger, would pay the remaining shareholders of Marathon sinking fund debentures worth approximately $85 per share.1 68 In reaction to Mobil's offer,
Marathon's board, on October 31, 1981, unanimously decided that
the offer was "grossly inadequate." The board then determined to
locate a "white knight" and persuade Marathon stockholders not to
69
tender. 1
On November 11 and 12 Marathon's board made public statements to its stockholders in the form of a press release and a letter.
Both statements recommended rejection of Mobil's bid as "grossly
inadequate" and against the best interests of the company.' 17 At
164. Radol, 772 F.2d at 247.
165. Id.
166. Other appraisals confirmed this. The Herold Oil Industry Comparative Appraisal placed Marathon's appraised values at $199 per share. Additionally, two reports
by security analysts revealed that Marathon's stock had an appraised value of between
$200 and $210 per share. Starkman, 772 F.2d at 234.
167. Id. at 235.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. The press release, issued on November 11, stated:
Our Board of Directors has determined that Mobil Corporation's unsolicited
tender offer is grossly inadequate. The offer is not in the best interests of Marathon Oil or its shareholders. It doesn't reflect current asset values and it
doesn't permit the long-term investor the opportunity to participate in the potential values that have been developed.
.... We plan to do everything we possibly can to defeat this offer. We are
determined to stay independent.
Id. at 235.
The next day Marathon mailed a letter to its stockholders urging rejection of the
offer and stating that it was "convinced that the Mobil offer is grossly inadequate and
does not represent the real values of the assets underlying your investment in Marathon." Id. at 235. The letter described a number of alternative courses of action under
consideration by the Board, including "repurchase of Marathon shares, acquisition of all
or part of another company, a business combination with another company, [and] the
declaration of an extraordinary dividend and a complete or partial liquidation of the
Company." Id. at 235-36. The letter ended by once again urging rejection of Mobil's
attempt to "seize control of Marathon's assets at a fraction of their value," and it further
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the same time, Marathon had contacted thirty to forty companies
considered to be reasonable merger candidates. These companies
t7
all received copies of both the Strong and First Boston reports,
On November 10 U.S. Steel (Steel) and Marathon had begun
negotiations for a possible merger. Steel received both reports on
the same day, and on November 12 Marathon delivered five-year
earnings forecasts and cash-flow projections to Steel. 17 2 Negotiations concluded on November 17, with an offer by Steel to purchase
up to 31 million shares (about 51%) of Marathon stock for $125 per
share in cash. A freeze-out merger would follow with the remaining
Marathon stockholders receiving a $100 face value, 12 year, 121/2% guaranteed note per share of common stock.17 3 On November 18 Marathon's board approved the agreement. 174 The next day,
November 19, Steel mailed its tender offer to Marathon stockholders.1 75 At the same time Marathon mailed a letter to its stockholders
recommending acceptance of Steel's offer.' 7 6 After the announcement of Steel's tender offer, the market price of Marathon stock rose
and fluctuated between $100 and $105 per share from November 19
until December 7.t77
Steel's offer was successful, with over 91% of the outstanding
shares tendered. 17 In February 1982 proxy solicitation materials
were sent out to the remaining stockholders seeking approval of the
second-stage freeze-out merger.' 79 The disclosure of the Strong
and First Boston appraisals to stockholders first occurred in the
proxy materials seeking approval of the merger.1 80 The proxy statestated that "[w]e are convinced that you and our other shareholders would be well
served if Marathon remains independent." Id. at 236.
Marathon attached a copy of its schedule 14D-9 to this letter. The company also
filed the schedule with the SEC pursuant to rule 14d-9, which requires target companies
to inform the SEC as to whether the target is recommending acceptance or rejection of
the tender offer to its stockholders. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9 (1986). The schedule disclosed that the board was recommending rejection of the offer. Starkman, 772 F.2d at
236. None of these disclosures revealed the Strong and First Boston reports. Id. at 23536.
171. Radol, 772 F.2d at 248.
172. Starkman, 772 F.2d at 235.
173. Id.
174. Id. Marathon received competing but more tentative proposals from Allied
Corp. and Gulf Oil Corp. Radol, 772 F.2d at 248.
175. Starkman, 772 F.2d at 235.
176. Radol, 772 F.2d at 249.
177. Id.
178. Starkman, 772 F.2d at 235.
179. Radol, 772 F.2d at 250.
180. Id.
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ment discussed the Strong and First Boston reports extensively, as
required by rule 13e-3' 8 1 in freeze-out mergers. The materials,
however, warned that the First Boston report "should not be regarded as an independent evaluation or appraisal of Marathon's assets."' 8 2 Nor were the two reports "viewed by Marathon's Board of
Directors as being reflective of.. . per share values that could realistically be expected to be received by Marathon or its shareholders in
a negotiated sale of the Company as a going concern or through
liquidation of the Company's assets."'' 8 3 Approval
of the merger be1 84
tween Marathon and Steel occurred in March.
2. The Diferences.-The Radol and Starkman fact patterns varied
in a number of ways. Specifically, each case evolved from claims
arising at different points in time in the basic factual scenario. In
Starkman the plaintiff sold his Marathon shares the day before the
announcement of Steel's tender offer.' 8 5 The plaintiffs in Radol, on
the other hand, comprised two groups, stockholders who tendered
their shares to Steel and those shareholders frozen-out in the subse8 6
quent merger.1
A second difference between the two cases relates to the type of
soft information covered by the respective plaintiffs' claims. In
Starkman the plaintiff's claim in his rule lOb-5 claim included not
only the nondisclosure of the Strong and First Boston reports but
also the five-year earnings forecasts, the cash-flow projections, and
the pending negotiations between Steel and Marathon.18 7 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the omission of this information in the
November 11 press release, the November 12 letter to stockholders,
and the schedule 14D-9 attachment to that letter was materially misleading.' 8 8 The plaintiff argued that this information's disclosure
would have affected a reasonable shareholder's evaluation of the
181. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1986).
182. Radol, 772 F.2d at 250.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Starkman, 772 F.2d at 233.
186. Radol, 772 F.2d at 250.
187. Starkman, 772 F.2d at 236. Not all authorities agree that preliminary negotiations
are a type of soft information. See, e.g., Walker v. Action Indus., 802 F.2d 703, 708 n.10
(4th Cir. 1986) (citing Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding a
duty to disclose merger negotiations)). But see Address by Schneider, supra note 2.
188. Starkman, 772 F.2d at 235-36. For the text of these documents, see supra note
170. The plaintiff also contended that Marathon's failure to disclose its search for a
"white knight" and its on-going negotiations with Steel made its statement that it might
remain independent misleading. Starkman, 777 F.2d at 235-36.
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likelihood that Marathon would have succeeded in negotiating a
higher price takeover.'" 9
In comparison, the plaintiffs' claim in Radol only involved the
nondisclosure of the Strong and First Boston reports. The plaintiffs
claimed the omission of this information was actionable not only
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 but also section 14(e). The
plaintiffs claimed such information was material to stockholders in
deciding whether to tender their shares. 190
A further point of distinction between the two cases is the district court findings. In Starkman the district court granted summary
judgment for Marathon. The basis for the judgment was that all soft
information had either been sufficiently disclosed or that such information need not be disclosed, since nondisclosure would not have
rendered Marathon's other affirmative public statements materially
misleading. t'
In Radol the district court concluded that the TSC Industries materiality standard, as relating to the Strong and First Boston asset
189. Id. at 236.
190. Radol, 772 F.2d at 251.
191. Starkman, 772 F.2d at 242. In granting summary judgment for Marathon, the
district court found that the net asset values stated in the Strong and First Boston reports were perfectly consistent with Marathon's public statements (in its November 11
press release, its November 12 letter to stockholders, and schedule 14D-9 attachment)
that Mobil's bid was grossly inadequate in light of the true value of Marathon's assets.
The district court further stated that rule lOb-5 did not require disclosure of the reports
because "disclosure of information which is consistent with other statements made is
obviously not necessary in order to make those statements not misleading. Such disclosure would simply reinforce, rather than correct or modify, the statements made." Id. at
237.
The district court summarily disposed of the five-year earnings and cash-flow projections claim by concluding that disclosure of such information is simply not required.
Id. (citing Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978, 986-87 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 954 (1977); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 421 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 830 (1974)).
As to the disclosure of negotiations with Steel, the district court held there was no
duty to disclose such information. Id. (citing Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 711 F.2d
11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1206 (3d Cir. 1982)). The
court explained that Marathon's schedule 14D-9 disclosure that the company was considering the acquisition of all or part of another company or merger with another company as an alternative to Mobil's tender offer was sufficient to meet whatever disclosure
obligation existed. Id.
The court also addressed the allegation that Marathon misled stockholders by stating its determination to remain independent when in fact it was negotiating with Steel in
the hope of finding a "white knight." The district court found that this statement was
not misleading when placed in the context of the repeated statements by Marathon that
Mobil's offer was "grossly inadequate" and that alternatives, including merger into another company, were under consideration. Id.

1100

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 46:1071

appraisals, was a question "best left to a jury."'9 2 Upon deliberation, the jury determined that the reports were not material and,
therefore, their omission was not actionable under the federal securities laws.' 9 ' The circuit court affirmed the district court's holding;
however, it noted that the court had committed error, albeit
nonre19 4
versible, in sending the issue of materiality to the jury.
3, The Starkman and Radol Decisions.-In addressing soft information disclosure obligations, the circuit court in Starkman first ascertained that no existing SEC rule or regulation specifically
required disclosure of the omitted information.' 9 5 The court then
reviewed soft information disclosure under the general antifraud
provision of rule 10b-5. In pursuing this issue, the court formulated
a three-pronged analysis in discussing soft information disclosure.
First, it stated that a duty to speak had to exist under rule lOb-5
before requiring disclosure of material facts.' 9 6 Second, any omission, to be actionable, must meet the TSC Industries materiality
192. Radol, 772 F.2d at 251.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 253.
195. Starkman, 772 F.2d at 239. The court concluded that neither rule 14e-2 nor
schedule 14D-9 requires disclosure of initial asset appraisals, appraisals done by outside
consultants such as First Boston, or earnings and cash flow projections. Id.
The court cited Radol for the proposition that rule 13e-3, requiring disclosure of
asset appraisals in proxy statements in freeze-out merger situations, was inapplicable for
determining the disclosure obligations of target management in the first stage of a twotier tender offer. Id. at 240. The court stated further that the SEC did not require the
disclosure of earning projections in any context. Id.
Finally, the court stated:
that the SEC and the courts have enunciated a firm rule regarding a tender
offer target's duty to disclose ongoing negotiations: so long as merger or acquisition discussions are preliminary, general disclosure of the fact that such
alternatives are being considered will suffice to adequately inform stockholders;
a duty to disclose the possible terms of any transaction and the parties thereto
arises only after an agreement in principle, regarding such fundamental terms
as price and structure has been reached.
Id. at 243 (citing item 7 of schedule 14D-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1986); Greenfield
v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 756-57 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985);
Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1207 (3d Cir. 1982); Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 711 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983)).
196. Starkman, 772 F.2d at 238 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235
(1980); Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., 744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984); Staffin v. Greenberg,
672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982)). The court did not agree with the position of some courts
and commentators that rule lOb-5 imposes an affirmative obligation on the corporation
to disclose all material information regardless of whether the corporation has made any
other statements. See, e.g., Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1979);
Bauman, Rule lOb-5 and the Corporation "sAffirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 GEO. LJ. 935
(1979).
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test.' 9 7

Finally, even if the first two prongs were met, the duty to
disclose under rule lOb-5 would be imposed "only if the nondisclosure of the particular material facts would make misleading the affirmative statements otherwise required by the federal securities
laws and SEC regulations."' 98
Since Marathon clearly had a duty to speak under rule 14e-2,
the court focused primarily on whether rule lOb-5 required disclosure of the information in question, the nondisclosure of which
would render misleading other statements made by Marathon. Furthermore, the court stated that "the starting point in [the] analysis is
the underlying regulatory policy toward disclosure of such information, since regulatory rules reflect careful study of general conditions prevailing in the securities marketplace and provide guidelines
upon which corporate officers and directors are entitled to rely."' 9 9
Briefly summarizing SEC policy, the court noted the SEC's recent shift toward allowing the disclosure of appraised asset valuations, projections, and other soft information, as long as the issuer
also disclosed the underlying assumptions, hypotheses, and predicted values forming the basis for the soft information. 20 0 At the
time of Steel's tender offer, however, the SEC actually forbade the
disclosure of estimates of probable and potential oil and gas
reserves-both major components of the Strong and First Boston
appraisals. 20 ' Fortunately for Marathon, the court could find no
197. Id. at 238. The court noted the applicability of the TSC Industries test in cases
involving rule lOb-5 in the tender offer context. Id. (citing Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters.,
744 F.2d 978, 978 (3d Cir. 1984); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1205 (3d Cir.
1982); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 282 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981)).
198. Id. The court prefaced its analysis by saying that its approach related to the
structuring of disclosure duties of a tender offer target. Whether this same analysis
would be used in other contexts is unclear. Both the Flynn and Walker cases have used a
similar analysis but have only talked about "the duty to speak" and "materiality," leaving out the last step of the approach in Starkman. The Starkman court explained that
requiring the disclosure of material facts if their nondisclosure would render statements
misleading ensured a balance between "the competing costs and benefits of disclosure."
Id. at 238-39. The court added that the benefits of disclosure, such as helping stockholders make informed decisions, are weighed against the production of mountains of
possibly confusing information resulting from the target's fear of liability. Such burdensome disclosure obligations might interfere with the negotiation of a higher tender offer
and actually reduce the likelihood that a shareholder will benefit from a successful
tender offer at a premium over the market. Id. at 239.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 239-40.
201. Id. at 241. The court stated that at the time of Steel's tender offer, regulation
S-K, which governed disclosure obligations in documents filed with the SEC, specifically
prohibited the disclosure of estimates of probable or possible oil and gas reserves in any
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compelling authority to overcome this prohibition and impose liability for failing to disclose asset appraisals "based on hypothetical
valuations. ' 20 2 Precedent2 0 3 not only failed to provide compelling
authority to require disclosure of the reports but affirmatively supported nondisclosure of soft information. 20 4 The court further explained that an affirmative duty to disclose projections and asset
appraisals may exist only if the information is substantially certain to
hold.20 5
Applying the "substantially certain to hold" test, the court
found the reports to be highly speculative 2 6 and misleading without
"an accompanying mountain of data and explanations. 20 7 For the
same reason, the court found no duty to disclose the five-year earnings and cash-flow projections. 20 8 As to the last prong of the analydocument filed with the SEC. Instruction 2 to item 2(b) of regulation S-K (citing Disclosure of Oil and Gas Reserves, Securities Act Release No. 6008, [1978 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,768, at 81,104 (Dec. 19, 1978)). The reason for the prohibition was the lack of reliability of this information and, therefore, the accompanying
possibility of misleading investors. Starkman, 772 F.2d at 240.
The court noted that regulation S-K had been amended in March 1982 to allow
disclosure of "estimated" as well as proven reserves when such estimates had previously
been given to a person who is offering to acquire or to merge with the target, see Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383, [Accounting
Services Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,328, at 63,003 (Mar. 3,
1982), but refused to apply it, citing § 23(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1)
(1982) (providing that no liability attaches under the federal securities law for "any act
done or omitted in good-faith conformity with a rule, regulation or order of the Commission"). The court also cited Gerstle in support of its refusal to impose liability on the
basis of ex post facto modifications in SEC policy. Starkman, 772 F.2d at 240-41.
202. Starkman, 772 F.2d at 241.
203. See supra note 155.

204. Starkman, 772 F.2d at 241.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 242. Hoopman and Strong both testified that the Strong report was a "selling document" that placed optimistic value on Marathon's oil and gas reserves in order
to attract buyers and ensure that Marathon could either ward off a hostile takeover attempt or, at the very least, obtain the best offer available and avoid being captured at a
bargain price. Id. at 234.
In Radol the court noted that the report estimated the present value of the oil and
gas properties based on "highly speculative" assumptions that related to the level of
prices and costs expected to prevail as far as thirty to fifty years into the future. 772 F.2d
at 247.
First Boston cautioned that the results of its asset valuation report did not represent
relative market values as evidenced by the large number of companies whose market
values were far less than their appraised values. First Boston also noted that the liquidation value would be significantly less than the appraised value because of the relative
bargaining positions in a liquidation. Id. at 248.
207. Starkman, 772 F.2d at 242.
208. Id. (citing Biechele v. Cedar Point, Inc., 747 F.2d 209, 216 (6th Cir. 1984);James
v. Gerber Prods. Co., 587 F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 1978)).
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sis, the asset appraisal, earnings, and cash-flow projections did not
require disclosure
to ensure that Marathon's other statements were
20 9
not misleading.
In Radol the court recognized and adopted the "substantially
certain to hold" test as the Sixth Circuit's approach to the disclosure
of soft information. 21 On appeal the plaintiffs had attacked the trial
court's jury instructions on materiality and the duty to disclose. 2 1
The circuit court affirmed the instructions; however, the court
added that the district court may have committed nonreversible error in sending the materiality issue to the jury.2 1 2 Although the
lower court correctly stated the TSC Industries materiality standard, it
erred in its decision to have the trier of fact decide the issue. The
district court found "it was conceivable that 'reasonable shareholder[s]' would have accorded the valuations 'actual significance'
in [their] deliberations, even if disclosure would not have altered
[their] decision[s]. 2 13 This standard was identical to a materiality
standard that the Supreme Court had specifically rejected in TSC
Industries. Under the rejected standard facts were material if a stockholder might have considered them important in making a decision. 2 4 According to the appeals court, "[t]he purpose of the more
stringent 'substantial likelihood' test for materiality is to lessen the
uncertainty facing corporate officials in determining what must be
disclosed while preserving shareholders' access to all truly factual
information." 21 5
In summary, the court found the information contained in the
Strong and First Boston reports to be too speculative and uncertain,
especially in light of the "substantially certain to hold" test in
209. Id.
210. Radol, 772 F.2d at 252-53. The merger negotiations did not require disclosure
for reasons already stated. See supra note 195.
211. Radol, 772 F.2d at 252. Specifically these instructions read as follows:
An omitted fact is material if there is substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would consider it important in deciding whether to tender his
stock.
Only disclosure of existing material facts is required. Economic forecasts
are not.
A failure to make known a projection of future earnings is not a violation of
the Federal Securities law.
Id.
212. Id. at 253.
213. Radol v. Thomas, 556 F. Supp. 586, 594 (S.D. Ohio 1983), aff'd, 772 F.2d 244
(6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 3272 (1986).
214. 772 F.2d at 253.
215. Id.
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Starkman.2 1 6 By citing Starkman and relying on its test, the Sixth Circuit adopted a concrete approach to the disclosure of soft
information.
E.

The Ninth Circuit: An Established View and a Possible New Trend

The Ninth Circuit's approach to the disclosure of soft information may be in transition. Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc.2" 7 and South Coast
Services Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley IrrigationCo. 2 18 are cited as authority

for the Ninth2 Circuit's
position that there is no duty to disclose
9
2 20 soft
information.

Two recent cases, however, Plaine v. McCabe

and

Texas Partnersv. Conrock Co. ,221 indicate a possible shift in Ninth Circuit law.
In Vaughn Teledyne initiated a series of acquisitions of its own
stock through a redemption and numerous tender offers between
June 1971 and November 1976.222 The plaintiffs, former stockholders of Teledyne, alleged that Teledyne violated section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, rule lOb-5, and section 14(e) of the Williams Act in
failing to disclose internal projections and forecasts. Teledyne allegedly had the reports prepared during the time it made the series
of tender offers for its own stock.2 2 3 Without determining the materiality of the projections, 4 the court summarily decided that no disclosure was necessary: "The SEC does not require a company to
disclose financial projections. '2 25 Additionally, the court noted the
216. Id. at 252-53.
217. 628 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1980).

218. 669 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1982).
219. See, e.g.,Walker v. Action Indus., 802 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 952 (1987); Bradshaw v. Jenkins, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 99,719 (W.D. Wash. 1984).
220. 797 F.2d 713 (9th Cir.), superceding 790 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1986).
221. 685 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1029 (1983).
222. Vaughn, 628 F.2d at 1217. During this five-year period, the number of outstanding shares of Teledyne common stock decreased from 38 million to 11 million.
Teledyne's earnings, on the other hand, increased dramatically in 1975 and 1976. Id.
223. Id. at 1217, 1221. Projections were not made for the entire company during that
period, but a growing number of Teledyne's operating units had twice annually prepared business plans. These plans contained estimates of such operating units' sales
and earnings as well as numerous other factors for the upcoming fiscal year. Id. at 1221.
224. Even though the court did not address this issue, it did comment that the proper
test would be "whether there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would
consider the fact important in making an investment decision." Id. The Ninth Circuit,
therefore, recognized the TSC Industries materiality test as being applicable to soft information disclosure.
225. Id. (citing Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, 38 Fed.
Reg. 7220 (1973); Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 199-200 (7th Cir. 1978) (finding
financial projections not material information in insider trading action); Marsh v. Ar-
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unreliability of the projections, commenting that there was no evidence that the estimates were made with such reasonable certainty
as to even allow them to be disclosed.2 2 6
The South Coast case involved the disclosure of asset appraisals.
The lawsuit questioned the adequacy of proxy statements soliciting
stockholders' approval to sell the assets of Santa Ana Valley Irrigation (SAVI) to Intercoast Investments, Inc. (Intercoast).2 2 7 The
plaintiffs, former stockholders and directors of SAVI, alleged that
under rule 14a-9 estimates of the fair market value of SAVI properties must be disclosed.2 28 In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that listing the historic book value of229the properties without current market
information was misleading.
As it had managed to do in Vaughn, the Ninth Circuit in South
Coast skirted the materiality issue by holding that neither the courts
nor the SEC required disclosure of asset appraisals-in fact, both
discouraged it. 23 0 The court relied on the note accompanying rule

14a-9 as particularly authoritative, 23 1 even though the appellants armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978, 987 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977) (finding
disclosure of projections not required under rule lOb-5 in merger proxy statement)).
The court did recognize, however, that partial disclosure of financial projections
may make them material facts and that an individual may be liable under rule lOb-5 if
those projections thereafter are not disclosed completely and accurately. Vaughn, 628
F.2d at 1221 (citingJames v. Gerber Prods. Co., 587 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1978); Sunstrand
denied, 434 U.S. 875
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1046 (7th Cir.), cert.
(1977); Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 489-92 (9th Cir. 1974) (partial
disclosure of earnings forecast may be actionable if it makes other statements
misleading)).
226. Only one court, the Fourth Circuit in Walker, has interpreted this statement to
suggest that the disclosure of financial projections is required if they are reasonably
certain. The Ninth Circuit's language in Vaughn, however, is to the contrary. Disclosure
isonly allowable, not required, if the projections are reasonably certain. Most courts
and commentators have cited Vaughn as a mandate against required disclosure of financial predictions. See, e.g., Bradshaw v.Jenkins, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 99,719 (W.D. Wash. 1984). See also Schneider, Soft Information and AppraisalDisclosure, 18 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 215, 218 n.19 (1985); South Coast
Servs. Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1982) (failing to
discuss or recognize the "reasonably certain" test).
227. 669 F.2d at 1267.
228. Id. at 1270.
229. Id.
230. Id. (citing Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1292-94 (2d Cir.
1973); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 265 (3d Cir. 1972); Denison
Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812, 819 (D. Del. 1974)). For the court's
treatment of the SEC's position, see infra note 231.
231. South Coast, 669 F.2d at 1271. The court admitted that the note did not refer
specifically to appraisals of current market value. It asserted, however, "[w]e agree ...
with the Second Circuit that 'it is clear that the policy embodied in the note to Rule 14a-
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gued that a subsequent amendment made it inapplicable.23 2 The
court "consider[ed] this limited amendment to be insufficient to alter the long-standing policy against appraisal information." 2
The
appellants also argued that the circuit court should adopt the SEC
policy of allowing and even requiring asset appraisals, as expressed
in the SEC amicus brief filed in Gerstle.23 4 The Ninth Circuit, like
the Second Circuit, refused to apply the new SEC policy
retroactively.23 5
Even if the court had applied the new SEC policy toward asset
appraisals, only appraisals made by qualified experts and having a
sufficient basis in fact required disclosure. 2 6 The SAVI board of
directors, which made the valuations, were not experts. Furthermore, the absence of underlying guidelines and standards made the
appraisals too speculative. 23 7 The South Coast court therefore followed Vaughn in finding no duty to disclose the soft information.
The Ninth Circuit in both cases made clear that it perceived traditional SEC policy as having current applicability.
Two Ninth Circuit cases since Vaughn and South Coast, Texas Partners v. Conrock Co. ,238 and Plainev. McCabe,2 1 9 indicate that there may,
9 has consistently been enforced to bar disclosure of asset appraisals as well as future
market values ..
" Id. (quoting Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1292).
232. Id. at 1271 n.3. The appellants referred to the 1976 amendment to the note
following the rule which deleted future earnings from the list of examples of potentially
misleading disclosures.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1271.
235. Id. (citing Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1294). The appellants interpreted the SEC's position in the Gerstle brief as requiring disclosure of reliable appraisals of the current fair
market value of assets when a liquidation is contemplated and the assets' liquidation
value is substantially higher than the historic book value. Id. For a discussion of Gerstle,
see supra notes 28-58 and accompanying text.
236. Id. at 1272. The text of the Gerstle amicus brief stated that "although appraisals
generally cannot be disclosed because they may be misleading, existing appraisals of
current liquidating value must be disclosed if they have been made by a qualied expert and
have a sufficient basis in fact." Id. (citing Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1292 (emphasis added)).

237. Id. Judge Fletcher wrote a vigorous dissent, disagreeing with the majority's interpretation of SEC policy as disfavoring asset valuation disclosure. Among other
things, he argued that this position is untenable when the nondisclosure of such information would violate rule 14a-9. Id. at 1275-76 (Fletcher,J., dissenting). Judge Fletcher
argued that information must meet the TSC Industries materiality standard before requiring disclosure. Id. at 1274. If the information is material,Judge Fletcher explained, the
next step is to determine whether the information would mislead investors. Id. at 1276.
He suggested that a qualifying disclosure, with disclaimer language dissuading undue
reliance by investors, would easily assuage any fears on that level. Id. at 1277. Because
these measures could easily have been taken in South Coast, Judge Fletcher concluded
that the failure to disclose the appraisal information was a violation of rule 14a-9. Id.
238. 685 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1029 (1983).
239. 797 F.2d 713 (9th Cir.), superceding 790 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1986).
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in fact, be a mandatory duty to disclose soft information in some
instances. 4 In Texas Partners stockholders of Conrock alleged that
Conrock's March 1980 proxy statement soliciting stockholder approval of two antitakeover amendments violated section 14(a) of the
Exchange Act and rule 14a-9 in failing to disclose the gross undervaluation of Conrock's assets. 2 4 ' Because of a $200 million undervaluation, Conrock, a real estate related company, was an attractive
takeover target. The stockholders contended that the undervaluation information was material in deciding how to vote on the proposed antitakeover proposals. The district court granted summary
judgment, but the circuit court held that the district court had erred:
In South Coast Services Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation
Co., supra, we held that disclosure of an estimate of the fair
market value of a company's assets by the Board of Directors was not required by Rule 14a-9 or section 14(a) because SEC policy then in effect discouraged disclosure of
appraised asset values and because, in any event, the appraisals were neither based on objective, reasonably certain
data nor prepared by a qualified expert. 669 F.2d at 127073. This does not necessarily foreclose at this stage appellants' argument that at some point in the proxy contest a
statement that the assets were substantially undervalued
should have been disclosed.2 4 2
The court went on to state that the appellee's reliance on cases
rejecting the disclosure of asset appraisals such as South Coast and
Gerstle was, therefore, inappropriate. The true issue, the court explained, was the materiality of the appraisals, an issue the district
court never considered. In light of these findings, the court then
2 43
remanded the case for further proceedings.
In Plaine the plaintiff, a former stockholder of Magma Power
Company, alleged violations of section 14(e) of the Williams Act in
connection with a tender offer that Natomas Company made for all
of the outstanding shares of Magma.24 4 Specifically, Natomas made
an initial tender offer on March 30, 1981, for all of Magma's shares
at $42 per share.24 5 Magma responded by calling the offer "wholly
240. These cases, when read together with Judge Fletcher's dissent in South Coast, may
reflect the future position of the Ninth Circuit regarding soft information disclosure.
241. Texas Partners, 685 F.2d at 1118, 1121.
242. Id. at 1121.
243. Id. No further action was taken since the case was withdrawn by the plaintiff
from further consideration.
244. 797 F.2d at 715.
245. Id.
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inadequate" in light of the company's principal asset, the Geysers
Projects.146 This asset, if fully taken into consideration, made
Magma's shares worth between $80 and $200 per share. 4 7 Magma
retained the investment firm of Smith Barney which rendered an
opinion that $42 per share was "inadequate from a financial point of
view."24s
In April 1981 Natomas and Magma began to negotiate the
terms of the original tender offer.2 4 9 In connection with this,
Magma hired the investment firm of Drexel Burnham to render advice. The discussions ended with an agreement that Natomas would
amend its offer to $45 per share and Magma would recommend acceptance to its shareholders.2 50 The agreement further provided
that any stockholders not tendering their shares during the period
of the tender offer would receive $45 in the eventual freeze-out
merger. 2 51 The companies jointly sent all Magma shareholders a
"Supplement to the Offer to Purchase" outlining the terms of the
agreement. Magma shareholders tendered 83% of their shares during the tender offer, with Natomas receiving the other 17% upon
252
approval of the merger.
The plaintiff opposed the merger and asserted that the "Offer
to Purchase" sent with the initial tender offer and the supplement
were false and misleading due to the omission of certain information. The omissions included projections of future revenues for the
Geysers and the financial opinions rendered by Smith Barney and
Drexel Burnham. 25 3 On appeal 2 54 the circuit court cited Texas Partners and Flynn as authority for the required disclosure of financial
projections.2 5 5 Determining that the "nature and reliability of the
undisclosed information [was] sufficiently in dispute to defeat the
246. Id. This project was the focus of Natomas' interest at the time of the initial offer.
Magma was a joint venturer in the Geysers with Natomas and Union Oil. Magma and
Natomas each had a 25% interest and Union Oil owned the remaining 50%. Id. at 715
n. 1.
247. Id. at 715.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 715-16. Magma was unable to find a "white knight." Id. at 715.
250. Id. at 715-16.
251. Id. at 716.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c), the district court converted the defendants'
motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment and ordered judgment for defendants on the grounds that the Commissioner's "fairness" decision collaterally estopped
Plaine from proving the injury element of the § 14(e) claim. Id.
255. Id. at 723.
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III.
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PROBLEMS WITH THE VARIOUS CIRCUIT APPROACHES

All of the circuits discussed in this article have in one way or
another acknowledged the general premise that when there is a duty
to speak, disclosure of material information is required. 25 8 Those
circuits that have steadfastly clung to traditional SEC policy 259 cite
to the common panoply of reasons for disallowing disclosure. The
common theme is the SEC's concern that the disclosure of soft information is potentially misleading. Absent a specific rule or regulation requiring disclosure of soft information, these circuits have
found no duty to speak. A genuine discussion of the materiality of
26 0
soft information disclosure is thus conveniently rendered moot.
The position these circuits have taken, however, can be criticized in several ways. First of all, reliance on the traditional SEC
approach in the area of soft information defeats the broader SEC
policy of protecting investors. 2 6 1 Recent SEC policy has, in fact,
recognized that total exclusion of such information can work to the
detriment of investors by excluding information valuable in making
informed decisions.2 6 2 The Flynn court explained that the SEC's
original policy against the disclosure of soft information was directed primarily at protecting potential purchasers of securities from
being misled by overly optimistic claims of management. 263 The
traditional SEC policy, while supposedly protecting purchasers,
harms sellers and other stockholders faced with making disclosure
decisions in the context of tender offers, mergers, and proxy
256. Id.
257. As of the writing of this article, the district court had not decided the matter.
258. The Third Circuit in Starkman and Radol added a further point in its analysisthat no duty to disclose arose unless the nondisclosure of the material facts would make
misleading the affirmative statements otherwise required by the federal securities laws
and SEC regulations. Starkman, 772 F.2d at 238.
259. These circuits include the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth.
260. The Fourth Circuit in Lockspeiser did consider the issue of materiality; however,
the case may be limited to its facts. See supra notes 118 and 153. Additionally, the Ninth
Circuit cases of Texas Partners v. Conrock Co., 685 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1029 (1983), and Plaine v. McCabe, 797 F.2d 713 (9th Cir.), superceding 790
F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1986), only indicate a possible trend toward requiring disclosure of
material soft information.
261. The purpose of the federal securities law is to protect investors by ensuring "fair
and honest" markets. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982).
262. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
263. Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., 744 F.2d 978, 987 (3d Cir. 1984).

1110

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 46:1071

contests.264

A second problem associated with the use of the traditional
SEC approach to soft information is that it defeats another SEC policy: promotion of an efficient market. 2 65 Efficiency of the market is
ensured by the full disclosure of all relevant information.2 6 6 In precluding the disclosure of soft information courts may in fact hamper
the efficiency of the market, by failing to determine which soft information is material or relevant and thus requires disclosure.
A third criticism of these circuits is their refusal to acknowledge
that there are certain factors that can diminish the possibility of soft
information being misleading. The SEC and some courts have recognized that this concern can be greatly alleviated through the use
of experts, disclaimers, and qualifying disclosures.2 6 7
Finally, these circuit courts are too paternalistic. The traditional policies they stubbornly cling to are relics of the crash of
1929.268 There is a refusal to acknowledge that for the most part
investors are no longer unsophisticated. Most investors are financial institutions or individuals who rely on the recommendations of
their brokers for investment advice.26 9 If information is soft, there is
just a natural assumption of the risk. Reasonable investors take this
into consideration, especially when the risks are disclosed fully
through the use of disclaimers or other disclosure methods. Additionally, many investors have portfolios, in which the risk of one
2 70
stock is diminished by other investments.
Only two circuits, the Third and Sixth, have recognized that a
264. Id.
265. Note, Mandatory Disclosure of CorporateProjectionsand the Goals of Securities Regulation,

81 COLUM. L. REV. 1525, 1527, 1529 (1981).
266. Id. at 1527. This theory is called the "efficient market hypothesis" and is
strongly supported by empirical evidence. See generally J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE
STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 270 (1973); Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A
Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970).
267. See, e.g., Flynn, 744 F.2d at 988; Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F.
Supp. 812, 819 (D. Del. 1974) (use of disclaimers and experts). See also supra notes 20-22
and accompanying text (discussing rule 175 which provides for use of experts who fully
disclose the bases of their assumptions).
268. See President Roosevelt's Mar. 29, 1933 Address to Congress, reprinted in, H.R.
REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
269. Note, Broker Investment Recommendations and the Efficient CapitalMarket H-ypothesis: A
Proposed Cautionary Legend, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1083 (1977).
270. See generally R. BREALY, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON
STOCK 124-28 (1969); Evans & Archer, Diversification and Reduction of Dispersion: An Empirical Analysis, 23J. FIN. 761, 767 (1968); Fisher & Lorie, Some Studies of Variability of Returns
of Investments in Common Stocks, 43 J. Bus. 99, 109-34 (1970); Lorie, Diversification Old and
New, 1 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 25, 27 (1975).
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duty to speak may exist and, thus, have been able to address the
issue of materiality. Even these circuits, however, are confusing and
uncertain in their approaches. Neither circuit has delineated the
particular situations in which the duty to speak arises. Additionally,
it is not clear whether the duty to speak pertains to everyone in a
uniform manner.2 7
If a duty to speak exists, both circuits have cited TSC Industries as
the appropriate test to determine whether soft information is material. Both the Third and Sixth Circuits, however, gave no more than
lip service to this test. The "substantially certain to hold" test in
Starkman and the "totality of circumstances" approach in Flynn have
in effect supplanted the TSC Industries test, not adopted it.
Starkman, in fact, developed two tests with respect to soft information disclosure, one more stringent than the other. The "substantially certain to hold" test is the test generally cited as the Sixth
Circuit's position. The Solicitor General's brief in the Radol case,
however, mentioned that the court of appeals in Starkman had "articulated a different and potentially more stringent version of its materiality standard. ' 27 2 That standard provided that asset appraisals
and projections must be disclosed only if the reported values are
"virtually as certain as hard facts. "273
Application of either test, but especially the "hard facts" test,
would make it almost impossible to find any soft information to be
material. Clearly the spirit of these two tests is to protect investors
from being misled by the disclosure of information that is less than
"factual." 2'7 4 But soft information by its nature is not factual in the
271. The district court in Flynn noted that corporate insiders were held to higher disclosure duties than outsiders, and concluded that for purposes of § 14(e) of the Williams
Act a tender offerer's outside status was one factor used in determining whether an
omission violated that section. The circuit court, however, did not specifically address
these comments in its opinion, leaving the issue unresolved. Additionally, the court did
not address whether disclosure duties under rule lOb-5 may be different from those
under § 14(e) of the Williams Act. See Note, Mandatory Disclosure of Soft Information, 35
EMORY L.J. 213, 248 (1986) (arguing that duties may be different).
272. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7 n.6, Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d
244 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1179 (1986) [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
273. Id. See also Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 625 F. Supp. 146 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
The Howing court found no duty to disclose earnings projections in a freeze-out merger
proxy statement. Id. at 156. The court relied on the "hard facts" test, explaining: "The
Court, in Starkman, further noted that the disclosure of 'soft' information such as appraisals and earnings projections is required only when 'the reported values are virtually
as certain as hard facts,' Id. at 241, and that earnings and cash flow projections do not
rise to the level of substantial certainty triggering a duty to disclose. Id. at 242." Howing, 625 F. Supp. at 156.
274. One of the reasons for the court's stringent tests may be that the type of soft
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true sense. If it were, the disclosure obligations of hard and soft
information would be treated, legally, in the same way. The
Starkman approach, however, ignores the correct application of the
TSC Industries test under which information not rising to the level of
hard facts can be found material. 7 5
In this light the Starkman test is in conflict with the TSC Industries
materiality standard. The existence of this conflict was an issue in
276
Radol. Yet the circuit court skirted a discussion of the conflict.
The Third Circuit, on the other hand, with its "totality of circumstances" test, has left the question of materiality wide open.
The failure to address how the TSC Industries test is reflected in the
Flynn criteria makes the Flynn approach extremely difficult to apply
information disclosure in Starkman was highly susceptible to being misunderstood. The
Solicitor General explained that the "Commission had long espoused the view that 'investors unfamiliar with the technical aspects of the oil and gas business-and these
would likely include most shareholders of major oil companies . . . would ignore or
misconstrue the technical but extremely significant differences between 'proved' and
'probable' oil reserves." Amicus Brief, supra note 272, at 12 n.12, (citing Brief for the
Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 5, Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 398 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1968)). The Solicitor General went on to
state that "[a]s one court explained, estimating probable [or possible or exploratory]
reserves involves excessive speculation and guesswork. Recognize [sic] experts disagree
as to the proper methods to be used." Id. at 13 n.12 (citing Sunray, 398 F.2d at 450-51;
Resource Exploration v. Yankee Oil & Gas, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 54, 62-64 (N.D. Ohio
1983); Del Noce v. Delyar Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,670, at 92,294 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1976)).
275. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969) (finding that speculative information as to potential ore bodies may
be material).
276. The appellants in Radol stated that the following jury instructions were in error.
The first instruction discussed the conflict between the "substantially certain to hold"
test and the materiality issue:
(1) "Representations concerning future sales, projections, forecasts and
the like only rise to the level of materiality when they can be calculated with
substantial certainty."
(2) "Only disclosure of existing material facts is required. Economic
forecasts are not."
(3) "A failure to make known a projection of future earnings is not a violation of Rule lOb-5."
Radol, 772 F.2d at 752.
The circuit court, however, eluded a discussion of the first instruction in its opinion
by citing the following instructions as being in contention:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would consider it important in deciding whether to tender his
stock.
Only disclosure of existing material facts is required. Economic forecasts
are not.
A failure to make known a projection of future earnings is not a violation of
the Federal Securities law.
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with any kind of certainty. 2 7 7 One author has posited that the Flynn
test's vagueness may encourage a burdensome over-disclosure of
information.2 7 s
The problems in both Starkman and Flynn may stem from the
possible inapplicability of the TSC Industries standard to soft information disclosure. The Solicitor General in the Radol amicus brief
recognized this possibility in observing that the TSC Industries test
was originally developed as a standard for determining the materiality of "facts." 2 79 Additionally, if application of the TSC Industries test
rules out the disclosure of soft information in most instances, then
this standard must be questioned as possibly prohibiting relevant
information from being disseminated into the market.

277. Schneider, Soft Information and Appraisal Disclosure, 18
REG. 215, 219-20 (1985).

278. Id.
279. Amicus Brief, supra note 272, at 15.
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